Shanthi Rajagopal
Iran’s nuclear programme is one of the most polarizing issues in one of the world’s most volatile regions. While American and European officials believe Tehran is planning to build nuclear weapons, Iran’s leadership says that its goal in developing a nuclear program is to generate electricity without dipping into the oil supply it prefers to sell abroad, and to provide fuel for medical reactors.
Iran’s claims that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes has not clogged the considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, the UN Security Council has responded to Iran’s refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment and heavy-water nuclear reactor programs by adopting several resolutions which imposed sanctions on Tehran. In spite of this, Iran continues to enrich uranium, install additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also continued work on its heavy-water reactor and associated facilities.
But it is not clear whether Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program or not. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in December 2007 assessed that Tehran “halted its nuclear weapons program,” defined as “Iran’s nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work,” in 2003. Tehran is also said to “keep open the option to develop nuclear weapons” and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is “inherently reversible.” Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to investigate the program, particularly evidence that Tehran may have conducted procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development.
Origin of the Nuclear Programme
It was during the 1950s that Iran started its nuclear programme. Tehran started constructing its U.S.-supplied research reactor in 1960; the reactor went critical in 1967. During the 1970s, Tehran pursued an ambitious nuclear power program; according to contemporaneous U.S. documents, Iran wanted to construct 10-20 nuclear power reactors and produce more than 20,000 megawatts of nuclear power by 1994.
A light-water nuclear power reactor was constructed near the city of Bushehr. Tehran also considered obtaining uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology. It was then that Iran took steps to demonstrate that it was not pursuing nuclear weapons. When Tehran signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1970, Iran also submitted a draft resolution to the UN General Assembly in 1974 that called for establishing a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East. But the concern had already started In the U.S.
This prompted Iran to cancel the nuclear program after the 1979 revolution, but it again reinstituted the program in 1982, according to a 1988 CIA report. A 1985 National Intelligence Council report, which cited Iran as a potential “proliferation threat,” stated that Tehran was “interested in developing facilities that could eventually produce fissile material that could be used in a [nuclear] weapon The Iranian government says that it plans to expand its reliance on nuclear power in order to generate electricity. This program will, Tehran says, substitute for some of Iran’s oil and gas consumption and allow the country to export additional fossil fuels.
Currently, a Russian contractor is completing the Bushehr reactor and Iran says it intends to build additional reactors to generate 20,000 megawatts of power within the next 20 years. Iranian officials claim that Tehran has begun design work on its first indigenously produced light-water reactor, which is to be constructed at Darkhovin. Iran has told the IAEA that construction on the reactor is scheduled to begin in 2011; it will be commissioned in 2015. However, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, stated October 4, 2009, that the “assembly of this plant will take ten years.”
It is also anticipated that “foreign experts” will be involved. Iranian officials have repeatedly asserted that the country’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hassan Qashqavi stated on November 10, 2008, that “pursuance of nuclear weapons has no place in the country’s defense doctrine.” President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad asserted during an April 9, 2009, speech that “those who accumulate nuclear weapons are backwards in political terms.”
But the United States and other governments continue to be concerned based on the argument that Iran may be pursuing, at a minimum, the capability to produce nuclear weapons. It is difficult to discriminate a peaceful nuclear program from a nuclear weapons program. In addition, military nuclear programs may coexist with civilian programs, even without an explicit decision to produce nuclear weapons.
The main source of proliferation concern is Tehran’s construction of a gas-centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment facility. Iran claims that it wants to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for its planned light-water nuclear reactors. Although Iranian officials have expressed interest in purchasing nuclear fuel from other countries, they assert that Tehran should have an indigenous enrichment capability as a hedge against possible fuel supply disruptions. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope. Such centrifuges can produce both LEU, which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. HEU can also be used as fuel in certain types of nuclear reactors. Iran also has a uranium-conversion facility, which converts uranium oxide into several compounds, including uranium hexafluoride.
One more thing of concern is the heavy-water reactor, which Iran is constructing at Arak. Although Tehran says that the reactor is intended for the production of medical isotopes, it is a proliferation concern because its spent fuel will contain plutonium well suited for use in nuclear weapons. Spent nuclear fuel from nuclear reactors contains plutonium, the other type of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. In order to be used in nuclear weapons, however, plutonium must be separated from the spent fuel—a procedure called “reprocessing.” Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing.
In addition to the dual-use nature of the nuclear programs described above, Tehran’s interactions with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have contributed to suspicions that Tehran has a nuclear weapons program. In the past, Iran has taken actions that interfered with the IAEA’s investigation of its nuclear program, including concealing nuclear activities and providing misleading statements. Although the IAEA has gotten a more complete picture of Iran’s nuclear program since its investigation began in 2002, the agency still wants Tehran to provide more information.
Current Nuclear hullabaloo
In August 2002, the National Council of Resistance on Iran (NCRI), an Iranian exile group, revealed information during a press conference (some of which later proved to be accurate) that Iran had built nuclear-related facilities at Natanz and Arak that it had not revealed to the IAEA. States-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are obligated to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. In the case of non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to the treaty (of which Iran is one), such agreements allow the agency to monitor nuclear facilities and materials to ensure that they are not diverted for military purposes.
Still, the agency’s inspections and monitoring authority is restricted to facilities that have been declared by the states-parties. Protocols to IAEA safeguards agreements dictate the agency’s ability to investigate clandestine nuclear facilities and activities by increasing the agency’s authority to inspect certain facilities and demand additional information from states-parties. The IAEA’s statute requires the agency’s Board of Governors to refer cases of non-compliance with safeguards agreements to the UN Security Council. Prior to the NCRI’s revelations, the IAEA had expressed concerns that Iran had not been providing the agency with all relevant information about its nuclear programs, but had never found Iran in violation of its safeguards agreement. In fall 2002, the IAEA began to investigate Iran’s nuclear activities at Natanz and Arak, and inspectors visited the sites the following February.
The IAEA board adopted its first resolution, which called on Tehran to increase its cooperation with the agency’s investigation and to suspend its uranium enrichment activities, in September 2003. Later, Iran concluded an agreement with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, collectively known as the “E3,” to suspend its enrichment activities, sign and implement an additional protocol to its 1974 IAEA safeguards agreement, and comply fully with the IAEA’s investigation. As a result, the IAEA board decided to refrain from referring the matter to the UN Security Council.
The investigations revealed that Iran had engaged in a variety of clandestine nuclear-related activities, some of which violated Iran’s safeguards agreement. These included plutonium separation experiments, uranium enrichment and conversion experiments, and importing various uranium compounds.
After October 2003, Iran continued some of its enrichment-related activities, but Tehran and the E3 agreed in November 2004 to a more detailed suspension agreement. However, Iran resumed uranium conversion in August 2005 under the leadership of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had been elected two months earlier. Iran announced in January 2006 that it would resume research and development on its centrifuges at Natanz. In response, the IAEA board adopted a resolution February 4, 2006, that referred the matter to the Security Council. Later Tehran announced that it would stop implementing its additional protocol.
In June 2006, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, collectively known as the “P5+1,” presented a proposal to Iran that offered a variety of incentives in return for Tehran taking several steps to assuage international concerns about its enrichment and heavy-water programs. The proposal called on the government to address the IAEA’s “outstanding concerns through full cooperation” with the agency’s ongoing investigation of Tehran’s nuclear programs, “suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities,” and resume implementing its additional protocol.
European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana presented a revised version of the 2006 offer to Iran in June 2008. Representatives from the P5+1 discussed the new proposal with Iranian officials in July 2008. Tehran has told the IAEA that it would implement its additional protocol “if the nuclear file is returned from the Security Council” to the agency. It is, however, unclear how the council could meet this condition. Iran’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Manouchehr Mottaki told reporters October 7, 2009, that Iran is not discussing ratification of the Protocol.
The 2006 offer’s requirements have also been included in several UN Security Council resolutions, the most recent of which, Resolution 1835, was adopted September 27, 2008. However, a November 2009 report from ElBaradei to the Security Council and the IAEA board indicated that Tehran has continued to defy the council’s demands by continuing work on both its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran issued another proposal in early September 2009, which described a number of economic and security issues as potential topics for discussion, but only obliquely mentioned nuclear issues and did not explicitly mention Iran’s nuclear program
Geneva Meeting- October 2009
During an October 1, 2009 meeting in Geneva with the P5+1 and Solana, Iranian officials agreed in principle to a proposal that would provide fuel enriched to 19.75% uranium-235 for Iran’s U.S.-supplied Tehran Research Reactor, which produces medical isotopes and operates under IAEA safeguards. Iran asked the agency in June 2009 to provide a new supply of fuel for the reactor, which will run out of fuel in approximately 18 months. Later, the United States and Russia presented a proposal to the IAEA (which the agency conveyed to Iran) for providing fuel for the reactor. Iranian officials have stated that, absent an agreement with international suppliers, Iran will produce its own fuel for the reactor. According to the proposal, Iran would transfer approximately 1,200 kilograms of its low-enriched uranium hexafluoride to Russia, which would either enrich the uranium to 19.75% uranium-235 or produce the LEU from Russian-origin uranium. Russia would then transfer the low-enriched uranium hexafluoride to France for fabrication into fuel assemblies. Finally, France would transfer the assemblies to Russia for shipment to Iran. Iran had, as of October 30, 2009, produced 1,763 kilograms of low-enriched uranium hexafluoride containing less than 5% uranium-235.
More recently, Iranian officials have suggested that Tehran would accept a compromise in which it would ship the LEU out of the country in phases. These officials have suggested that the LEU would be simultaneously exchanged for fuel on an Iranian island or in a third country, such as Turkey.
Iran’s Cooperation with the IAEA
Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran’s nuclear program. Iran maintains that it has not conducted any work on nuclear weapons. Iran and the IAEA have had a series of discussions regarding these issues. The agency has provided Iran with documents or (in some cases) descriptions of documents, which themselves were provided to the IAEA by several governments, indicating that Iranian entities may have conducted studies related to nuclear weapons development. The IAEA has asked Tehran about other information suggesting that the country may have pursued nuclear weapons, such as
- information about a high level meeting in 1984 on reviving Iran’s pre-revolution nuclear programme
- the scope of a visit by officials” associated with Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization “to a nuclear installation in Pakistan in 1987”
- information on 1993 meetings between Iranian officials and members of a clandestine procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer Khan; and
- information about work done in 2000 which apparently related to reprocessing.
The agency also wants Iran to provide more information on nuclear-related procurement, production, and research activity by entities linked to Iran’s military and defense establishments. These included attempts to obtain items, such as spark gaps, shock wave software, and neutron sources, which could be useful for developing nuclear weapons. In addition, ElBaradei’s May 2008 report notes that “substantial parts” of Iran’s centrifuge components “were manufactured in the workshops of the Defence Industries Organization.”
ElBaradei’s November 2008 report points out that the IAEA, with the exception of the document related to uranium metal, has “no information on the actual design or manufacture by Iran” of components (nuclear or otherwise) for nuclear weapons. That report, as well as subsequent reports from ElBaradei, also suggests that Iran and the IAEA are at an impasse. Tehran has not cooperated with the agency on these matters since ElBaradei’s September 2008 report.
Current Status of Iran’s Nuclear Programs
Some non-governmental experts and former U.S. officials have argued that, rather than producing fissile material indigenously, Iran could obtain such material from foreign sources. A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) made public December 3, 2007, states that the intelligence
community “cannot rule out that Iran has acquired from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material for a weapon.” Iran is continuing work on a fuel manufacturing plant that, when complete, is to produce fuel for the Arak and Darkhovin reactors. The plant has produced fuel rods and appears to be nearly complete.
Uranium Enrichment
Iran has a pilot centrifuge facility and a larger commercial facility, both located at Natanz. The latter is eventually to hold more than 47,000 centrifuges. Former Vice President Gholamreza Aghazadeh, who also headed Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization until July 2009, explained in February 2009 that Iran’s goal is to install all of them by 2015.
Individual centrifuges are linked together in cascades; each cascade in the commercial facility contains 164 centrifuges. According to ElBaradei’s November 2009 report, Iran was, as of November 2, feeding uranium hexafluoride into 24 cascades (3,936 centrifuges) of first generation (IR-1) centrifuges and is operating at least another 12 cascades (1,968 centrifuges) without feedstock. Tehran is also installing and testing additional IR-1 centrifuges in the facility.
Iran’s efforts to augment the facility’s enrichment capacity have slowed in recent months
In addition to its centrifuge work, Iran produced approximately 541 metric tons of uranium hexafluoride between March 2004 and August 10, 2009. Prior to 2009, Tehran apparently improved its ability to produce centrifuge feedstock of sufficient purity for light-water reactor fuel; whether Iran is currently able to produce feedstock pure enough for weapons-grade HEU is unclear.
The extent to which Iran’s progress is sustainable is open to question. Former Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer Khan described Pakistan’s first-generation centrifuges as “unsuccessful” in a 1998 interview. Iran’s ability to produce additional feedstock for centrifuges may be hindered by its dwindling supply of uranium oxide; Tehran is apparently running out of foreign supplied uranium oxide and, although Iran is producing more of the material from indigenously mined uranium, it had not yet transferred any indigenously produced uranium oxide to its uranium conversion facility as of June 2009.
Qom Facility
Despite the intelligence assessment described in the previous paragraph, Iran revealed that it was constructing a new gas-centrifuge-based enrichment facility in September 2009. Iranian officials have said that the facility is for peaceful purposes and that Tehran has acted in accordance with its international obligations. In addition to the Qom facility, Iranian officials have indicated that Tehran intends to construct ten additional centrifuge plants—a goal that many analysts argue is virtually unachievable.
Plutonium
Iran acknowledged to the IAEA in 2003 that it had conducted plutonium-separation experiments—an admission which aroused suspicions that Iran could have a program to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.
Arak Reactor
Iran says that its heavy-water reactor, which is being constructed at Arak, is intended for the production of medical isotopes. According to a May 5, 2008, presentation by Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the reactor is to substitute for an “outdated” LEU-fueled research reactor in Tehran that has been in operation since 1967.
The reactor is a proliferation concern because its spent fuel will contain plutonium better suited for nuclear weapons than the plutonium produced by lightwater moderated reactors, such as the Bushehr reactor. In addition, Iran will be able to operate the reactor with natural uranium, which means that it will not be dependent on supplies of enriched uranium. Salehi stated September 26, 2009, that the reactor would be “operational” within the next three or four years.
Bushehr Reactor
Iran is also constructing near the city of Bushehr a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power reactor moderated by light water. According to ElBaradei’s August report, loading fuel into the reactor was scheduled to take place during October and November 2009, but this has not yet occurred.
Iran Nuclear Program 2010
Top American military officials said in April 2010 that Iran could produce bomb-grade fuel for at least one nuclear weapon within a year, but would most likely need two to five years to manufacture a workable atomic bomb. International inspectors said in May that Iran has now produced a stockpile of nuclear fuel that experts say would be enough, with further enrichment, to make two nuclear weapons.
On Feb. 9, 2010, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, said scientists at the Natanz nuclear facility south of Tehran had begun processing uranium to a purity level of 20 percent to provide fuel for a research reactor producing medical isotopes, raising alarms in Israel and the West.
Enriching uranium to 20-percent purity is high enough for use in a medical reactor but significantly lower than the 90-percent levels needed for nuclear weapons. The worry is that any effort to produce 20-percent enriched uranium would put the country in a position to produce weapons-grade uranium in a comparatively short time.
The decision by Iran to pursue further enrichment elicited sharp reactions in several countries. The United States has been seeking United Nations backing for new sanctions, and has been talking with Britain and France, its closest allies on the United Nations Security Council, as well as Germany. Those countries have long supported tougher measures, which have been resisted by Russia and China. But both Russia and China have signaled new willingness to consider sanctions.
On Feb. 18, 2010, the United Nations’ nuclear inspectors declared for the first time that they had extensive evidence of “past or current undisclosed activities” by Iran’s military to develop a nuclear warhead. The report, the first under the new director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano, also concluded that the nation’s weapons-related activity apparently continued “beyond 2004.” The I.A.E.A. report confirmed that Iran has enriched small quantities of uranium to 20 percent, but made no assessment of how close it might be to producing a nuclear weapon. It cited recently collected evidence that conveyed a picture of a concerted drive in Iran toward a weapons capability.
In April, Mr. Obama announced a new nuclear strategy designed to ease fears in non-nuclear states that the United States might ever use atomic weapons against them. But Mr. Obama pointedly excluded countries like Iran and North Korea that have failed to live up to their obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
The questions of Iran’s sincerity was again raised by its announcement on May 17 of an agreement negotiated by Turkey and Brazil that could offer a short-term solution to its ongoing nuclear standoff with the West, or prove to be a tactic aimed at derailing efforts to bring new sanctions against Tehran. The deal calls for Iran to ship 2,640 pounds of low enriched uranium to Turkey, where it would be stored. In exchange, after one year, Iran would have the right to receive about 265 pounds of material enriched to 20 percent from Russia and France. The terms mirrored a deal with the West last October that had fallen apart when Iran backtracked, but by May 2010 the material to be shipped represented a far smaller portion of its enriched uranium.
The International Atomic Energy Agency reported that Iran has now produced over 5,300 pounds of low-enriched uranium, all of which would have to undergo further enrichment before it could be converted to bomb fuel.
Until recently, all of Iran’s uranium had been enriched to only 4 percent, the level needed to run nuclear power reactors. While increasing that to 20 percent purity does not allow Iran to build a weapon, it gets the country closer to that goal. The inspectors reported that Iran had installed a second group of centrifuges – machines that spin incredibly fast to enrich, or purify, uranium for use in bombs or reactors – which could improve its production of the 20 percent fuel.
The Fourth Round of Sanctions
On June 9 2010, the United Nations Security Council leveled its fourth round of sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program, but the measures did little to overcome widespread doubts that they — or even the additional steps pledged by American and European officials — would accomplish the Council’s longstanding goal: halting Iran’s production of nuclear fuel.
The new resolution, hailed by President Obama as delivering “the toughest sanctions ever faced by the Iranian government,” took months to negotiate and major concessions by American officials, but still failed to carry the symbolic weight of a unanimous decision. Twelve of the 15 nations on the Council voted for the measure, while Turkey and Brazil voted against it and Lebanon abstained.
After the Obama administration imposed additional sanctions on more than a dozen Iranian companies and individuals with links to the country’s nuclear and missile programs, the European Union followed suit on June 17 2010 with what it called “inevitable” new measures against Tehran. The main thrust of the sanctions is against military purchases, trade and financial transactions carried out by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which controls the nuclear program and has taken a more central role in running the country and the economy.
The United States had sought broader measures against Iran’s banks, insurance industry and other trade, but China and Russia were adamant that the sanctions not affect Iran’s day-to-day economy.
July 2, 2010
President Obama signed into law new unilateral American sanctions on Iran that go beyond the penalties imposed by the United Nations in June 2010. The new law, passed by Congress on overwhelmingly bipartisan votes last week, tries to further restrict investment in Iran’s energy sector and cut off financing for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps that oversees nuclear and missile programs. It also cracks down on federal contractors that do business with Iran.
The new sanctions contribute to a strategy under which the United States, Australia, Canada and Europe take individual actions on top of the measures approved by the United Nations Security Council in June. With Russia and China holding veto power on the council, there were limits on how far the United Nations would go in penalizing Iran. But the subsequent unilateral actions are intended to increase the pain on the Tehran government.
The law signed by Mr. Obama imposes penalties on foreign entities that sell refined petroleum to Iran or assist Iran with its domestic refining capacity. It also requires that American and foreign businesses that seek contracts with the United States government certify that they do not engage in prohibited business with Iran.
A New York Times analysis in March, 2010 found that the federal government had awarded more than $107 billion in contract payments, grants and other benefits over the past decade to foreign and multinational American companies while they were doing business in Iran. That included $15 billion paid to companies that defied American sanctions by making large investments that helped Iran develop its vast oil and gas reserves.
The law produced one of the few moments of consensus in Washington. Joining Mr. Obama on stage at the White House was Representative Eric Cantor of Virginia, the second-ranking House Republican.
Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant operative from 21.08.2010
After a delay of more than five years, Iran has begun operating its Bushehr nuclear reactor, the heads of the Iranian and Russian atomic agencies announced on 21.08.2010.
The 1,000-megawatt facility is designed to generate electricity, and experts and military officials in Israel, the United States and Western Europe say the prospect the reactor will be used in Iran’s military nuclear program is extremely small.
The head of Iran’s atomic energy agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, held a news conference at Bushehr on 21.08.2010 with the head of Russia’s Rosatom state nuclear power company, Sergei Kiriyenko. Salehi said a symbol of Iran’s peaceful use of nuclear technology had been launched despite pressure by Western countries.
On Saturday the 21st August, 2010, the United States sent a calming message to Israel stating that the new reactor was designed for peaceful purposes for producing electricity and does not threaten Israel.
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